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THE KEY TO BEING A GOOD REFEREE: THE CALL THE
NINTH CIRCUIT MISSED WHEN EVALUATING FALSE
ENDORSEMENT CLAIMS
ABSTRACT
Society is consumed with celebrities, and celebrity identity has pervasive
power. We keep up with the Kardashians and judge singing with Adam Levine.
If Doctor Oz recommends a weight-loss pill, we go out and buy it. If a burger
restaurant is called Bobby Flay’s, that’s the hot spot to go eat. Celebrity
identities are powerful brands that are subject to abuse by others who may
incorporate a celebrity’s identity into their product without permission. There
are celebrity look-alikes and soundalikes. Celebrity likenesses have been
appropriated to sell everything from cars to VCRs. Two bodies of law are
turned to when there is unauthorized exploitation of a celebrity’s likeness or
persona. One, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, is a federal trademark statute,
and the other is the common law right of publicity. Congress designed
Section 43(a) to protect consumers from mistakenly believing that a celebrity
endorsed a particular product, while the right of publicity centers on the
celebrity’s economic interest in his or her own identity.
The interests that both the Lanham Act and the right of publicity are
designed to protect must be balanced with the First Amendment interest in free
speech. Freedom of speech is a widely and heavily protected constitutional
right that encompasses free expression within various platforms, including
videogames. If an individual merely states that he does not like Carmelo
Anthony, this statement will be protected as free speech, and there are no
countervailing concerns of consumer confusion or economic cost to Anthony. If
an individual wrote a play about Carmelo Anthony’s journey to becoming a
basketball star, and Anthony had no involvement in creating the play, then
countervailing concerns are present and must be balanced with the interest in
free expression. This balancing of interests highlights an inherent tension:
when should the broad constitutional right to free speech bow to a
countervailing concern for false endorsement of products and a celebrity’s
right of publicity?
The Ninth Circuit recently decided two cases dealing with this balance.
Both cases concern the use of well-known football players’ likenesses in a
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videogame series. One celebrity opted to bring suit under the Lanham Act,
while the other chose the right of publicity. The two cases had very similar fact
patterns, but the Ninth Circuit used different tests to analyze the claims,
leading to opposite holdings. What was different about the prevailing plaintiff
in the right of publicity claim? Is there a way to take the celebrity’s and the
consumers’ interests into account without stifling free speech? What test
should the Ninth Circuit, and other courts, use to evaluate Section 43(a)
Lanham Act claims?
This Comment advances the novel argument that the Ninth Circuit and
other courts should use a new test, combining the transformative use test and a
modified likelihood of confusion test when evaluating Section 43(a) Lanham
Act claims. The proposed test provides an analysis that focuses on protecting
free speech without annihilating the possibility of the balanced concerns
prevailing. The test takes the artist’s, consumers’, and the celebrity’s interests
into account and mitigates the problems caused by having a lack of a federal
right of publicity.
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 1391
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INTRODUCTION
Celebrities have a powerful influence in society. The public is engrossed by
what celebrities wear, say, and do, whether the focus is on how to diet like a
particular icon1 or what lotion a star recommends.2 A celebrity’s identity is a
powerful tool that can be used to sway consumer purchases, regardless of
whether the celebrity is affiliated with the product. A celebrity’s identity can
therefore be used illegally for financial gain at the expense of both the star and
the consumer.
Beyoncé is an internationally renowned music artist.3 One of her song’s
lyrics state, “My persuasion can build a nation,” describing her potential
influence over society.4 She recently released a surprise album, which is the
first since 2009 to sell over 300,000 copies during the first three weeks of
sales.5 Society pays close attention to what Beyoncé does, and this makes her
an easy target for exploitation. If a person wrote a book entitled Queen Bee’s
Singing Tips,6 fans may be duped into believing that Beyoncé was somehow
affiliated with the book, causing consumers to go out and buy it. If the book
was entitled Singing Tips and discussed how Beyoncé warms up her vocal
cords before a show, consumers may still mistakenly think that Beyoncé was

1 Lisa Lillien, 5 Healthy Celebs––And How to Eat Like Them!, Tyra Banks, PEOPLE (Dec. 30, 2013, 2:16
PM ET), http://greatideas.people.com/2013/12/30/5-healthy-celebs-and-how-to-eat-like-them/ (click to page
“3 of 6” using the arrows at the top of the webpage).
2 Zoë Ruderman, Exclusive! Shop the Skin-Perfecting Lotion Gweneth Paltrow Uses, Now in Travel
Size, PEOPLE (Nov. 25, 2013, 6:00 AM ET), http://stylenews.peoplestylewatch.com/2013/11/25/exclusiveprtty-peaushun-travel-size-joyus-discount/ (explaining that Gweneth Paltrow, Rihanna, and Cate Blanchett use
a particular skin lotion).
3 See BEYONCÉ, http://www.beyonce.com/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2015).
4 BEYONCÉ, Run the World (Girls), on 4 (Columbia Records 2011).
5 Keith Caulfield, Beyoncé Leads for Third Week at No. 1 at Billboard 200 Chart, BILLBOARD (Jan. 2,
2014, 12:54 PM EST), http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/5855135/beyonce-leads-for-third-week-at-no1-on-billboard-200-chart (explaining that Beyoncé’s new album sold 1.3 million copies during the first
seventeen days of the album’s release in the United States).
6 See
Queen
Bee
(Beyoncé),
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Queen-BeeBeyonce/187649358422 (last visited Apr. 27, 2015) (showing that one of Beyoncé’s nicknames is Queen Bee
and her fans are called the Beyhive); see also Beyoncé, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
beyonce/timeline (last visited Apr. 27, 2015); Beyhive Birthday Love, BEYONCÉ (Sept. 4, 2012),
http://www.beyonce.com/beyhive-birthday-love-2/.
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connected with the book and in turn purchase the book. The appropriation of
Beyoncé’s identity is a form of unfair competition.
Unfair competition is a broad area of law7 that encompasses unauthorized
exploitation of celebrity likeness.8 Both Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and
the common law right of publicity concern the use of one’s likeness without
consent.9 Section 43(a) focuses on shielding consumers from confusion—
preventing consumers from going out and buying Singing Tips due to the belief
that Beyoncé endorsed the book. Right of publicity on the other hand is
interested in protecting Beyoncé’s economic interest in her own identity. Both
of those interests need to be balanced with the countervailing First Amendment
interest in free expression. For instance, the author of Singing Tips has a First
Amendment right to create and disseminate the expressive idea captured in her
book.
The Ninth Circuit uses different tests to balance these crucial interests
depending on whether a claim is brought as a violation of Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act or the right of publicity. Ultimately, this Comment argues that the
Ninth Circuit uses an inadequate test when analyzing Section 43(a) claims and
that the test the court uses for right of publicity claims does not sufficiently
take consumers’ interests into account. The Ninth Circuit, and all courts,
should use a new test, initially incorporating the test used to analyze right of
publicity claims and add to that test to take the author’s, consumers’, and
Beyoncé’s interests into account.
Part I of this Comment explores two bodies of law that are applicable to
claims of unauthorized use of a celebrity’s likeness. First, Part I delves into
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. After briefly explaining trademark law,
Part I details the purpose of Section 43(a). The terms Section 43(a) and false
endorsement will be used interchangeably throughout this Comment. Next,
Part I discusses the right of publicity and what the right is designed to protect.
Part I concludes with a comparison of Section 43(a) and the right of publicity,
explaining the key differences between the two.

7 See James E. Clevenger, 44 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D False Advertising Under Lanham Act
§ 43(a)(1)(B) (1997).
8 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989) (“The law of unfair
competition has its roots in the common-law tort of deceit: its general concern is with protecting consumers
from confusion as to source.”); GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION: LAW AND POLICY 883–84 (3d ed. 2010).
9 DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 8, at 883.
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Part II introduces the First Amendment and the interests it seeks to protect.
Part II discusses the balance of the interest in free speech against Section 43(a)
interests, including an explanation of the test the Ninth Circuit uses when
balancing such interests. Part II then focuses on the balance of free expression
and the interests the right of publicity seeks to protect. Lastly, Part II explores
the test the Ninth Circuit uses when evaluating right of publicity claims.
Part III examines two recent Ninth Circuit cases. First, Part III describes the
background of the artistic work involved in both cases. Part III then explains
the first case, Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., a suit alleging a violation of
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Part III then explores In re NCAA
Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation (Keller), which was a
right of publicity suit. Finally, Part III will describe the Ninth Circuit’s
application of two different tests when evaluating the claims based on the body
of law under which the plaintiff brought suit.
Part IV critiques the analytical reasoning the Ninth Circuit utilized in
Brown and highlights flaws in the Ninth Circuit’s test when balancing
Section 43(a) claims against free speech rights. Part IV then explains that the
test used in Keller, balancing the right of publicity against free speech, is more
analytically appropriate for Section 43(a) claims but is still insufficient. Part IV
proposes a new test for courts to use, consisting of the transformative use test,
combined with a modified likelihood of confusion test. The Ninth Circuit
previously used the likelihood of confusion test when analyzing Section 43(a)
claims. The proposed test initially balances the First Amendment interest in
free speech against the celebrity’s interests, and then it takes consumers’
interests into account. Part IV concludes with an explanation of why courts
should use the new test and applies the proposed test to Brown to demonstrate
how courts would apply the test and what the outcome of the case would have
been.
I. TWO BODIES OF LAW DEALING WITH USE-OF-LIKENESS CLAIMS
There are two main bodies of law that deal with use-of-likeness claims. The
first body of law is Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which is a federal
trademark statute. The second is the common law right of publicity. Although
both pertain to the use of a celebrity’s likeness, Section 43(a) and the right of
publicity are two distinctive claims. A celebrity may opt to bring suit pursuant
to Section 43(a) rather than the right of publicity, or vice versa, due to
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important differences in the two bodies of law. The differences between these
two claims are important to recognize.
A. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
In order to understand Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, it is important to
know basic trademark law. “A trademark is a word, name, symbol, device or
other designation, or a combination of such designations, that is distinctive of a
person’s goods or services and that is used in a manner that identifies those
goods or services and distinguishes them from the goods or services of
others.”10 Trademarks have been used for hundreds of years in order to express
the ownership or source of goods or services.11
Trademark rights are attained when the trademark is used in commerce.12
The United States’ use-based system means that an unregistered trademark still
has enforceable rights in federal court via the Lanham Act.13 Congress enacted
the Lanham Act in 1946,14 codifying trademark law in an attempt to prevent,
among other things, unfair competition.15 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
focuses on consumer protection with the goal of shielding consumers from
confusion.16 Over time, Section 43(a) has been interpreted to extend trademark
protection to a person’s identity.17 Thus, the goal of Section 43(a) applies to

10

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (1995).
PAUL GOLDSTEIN & R. ANTHONY REESE, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE
DOCTRINES 167 (7th ed. 2012) (“Archaeologists have unearthed Greek vases of the fifth and sixth centuries
B.C. bearing the potter’s mark.”).
12 DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 8, at 318–19. A trademark can be registered if an applicant applies for
registration and trademark examiners find that the application is in compliance with formal and substantive
requirements. Id. at 320. “Trademark registration, then, does not create rights; it only confirms the existence of
rights.” Id. Some of the benefits of registering a trademark are that the trademark owner has prima facie
evidence of the validity of the registered mark, ownership of the mark, and the exclusive right to use the
registered mark. Id.
13 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §27:14 (4th ed.
2008) (“[S]uch a mark or trade dress should receive essentially the same protection as those that are
registered.” (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 776 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring)));
see also Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1404 (9th Cir. 1997).
14 GOLDSTEIN & REESE, supra note 11, at 167–68 (“Systematic legal protection of trademarks began to
take shape in the early years of the nineteenth century as courts in England and the United States gradually
evolved a distinct law of trademark infringement as a branch of the more general unfair competition doctrine
of passing off.”).
15 See DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 8, at 833–34.
16 GOLDSTEIN & REESE, supra note 11, at 168.
17 Id.
11
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confusion about celebrity affiliations with, and endorsements of, products.18 As
the Sixth Circuit explained, Section 43(a) “permits celebrities to vindicate
property rights in their identities against allegedly misleading commercial uses
by others . . . . [C]ourts routinely recognize a property right in celebrity
identity akin to that of a trademark holder under § 43(a).”19
Looking at the first part of the quote above, Section 43(a) deals with cases
of “unwanted attribution” where a “person’s identity is used without
permission in connection with another’s product or service.”20 Under this
category, a plaintiff can assert a claim for confusion or passing off, also known
as false endorsement under Section 43(a)(1)(A).21 Logically, a false
endorsement claim involves some element of falsity.22 Specifically, there are
two forms of falsity involved in these claims. The fallacy involved in a case
may include a misleading description of fact or misleading representation of
fact that either
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or
her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person’s goods, services or commercial activities[.]23

An example is helpful here to understand how an element of falsity is
involved in false endorsement claims. In Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,24 Tom Waits,
a professional singer, brought a false endorsement claim under Section 43(a)
against Frito-Lay.25 Waits brought the claim because Frito-Lay had
18 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012); see, e.g., Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2013);
GOLDSTEIN & REESE, supra note 11, at 169 (“[The Act] widens the compass of federal unfair competition law
under section 43(a) . . . .”).
19 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 28:15 (alterations and omissions in original) (quoting Parks v. LaFace
Records, 329 F.3d 437, 445, 447 (6th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
20 DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 8, at 834.
21 Id. Under the category of unwanted attribution, a plaintiff can also assert a claim for false advertising
under Section 43(a)(1)(B). The second category of claims involves “under-attribution,” in which there are
misleading omissions that do not give proper credit to an individual. See id. While these types of claim exist,
they will not be the focus of this Comment and, as such, will not be discussed further.
22 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A); DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 8, at 834.
23 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(a)(1)(A)–(B).
24 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), abrogation recognized by Fifty-Six Hope Rd. Music, Ltd. v.
A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 778 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2015).
25 Id. at 1096; DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 8, at 834.
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advertisements that used a Waits soundalike to promote its products.26 Waits
argued that the use of the soundalike created consumer confusion and
improperly suggested Waits’s endorsement of the product.27 The Ninth Circuit
explained that
[a] false endorsement claim based on the unauthorized use of a
celebrity’s identity is a type of false association claim, for it alleges
the misuse of a trademark, i.e., a symbol or device such as visual
likeness, vocal imitation, or other uniquely distinguishing
characteristic, which is likely to confuse consumers as to the
plaintiff’s sponsorship or approval of the product.28

The court held that the evidence, including a comparison of recordings of
Waits’s voice and recordings of the voice used in the commercial, supported
the jury’s finding that the advertisement likely caused consumers to be
confused into thinking that Waits endorsed Frito-Lay’s product.29 Thus, Waits
prevailed on his Section 43(a) claim because the use of a soundalike created
consumer confusion and improperly implied that Waits endorsed the product.30
As further noted by the Sixth Circuit in the second half of the quoted
language above, an individual’s persona is a type of trademark that may be
infringed by a false endorsement, but all of the traditional characteristics of a
trademark are not required.31 The Ninth Circuit applies logic similar to that of
the Sixth Circuit by holding that a celebrity’s persona can serve as a
trademark.32 The key is that Section 43(a)(1)(A) prohibits the use of “a false or
misleading representation that is likely to cause confusion as to either the
26

Waits, 978 F.2d at 1097.
Id. at 1098; DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 8, at 834.
28 Waits, 978 F.2d at 1110.
29 Id. at 1111; DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 8, at 835. It is important to note that the test used by the
jury, which looked at factors from the likelihood of confusion test, is no longer the test used by the Ninth
Circuit for false endorsement claims today. See id. The likelihood of confusion test will be discussed in more
detail later in this Comment as part of the proposed test for the Ninth Circuit and other courts to apply when
evaluating false endorsement claims. See infra Part IV.C. The Ninth Circuit has rejected the likelihood of
confusion test and held that it failed to fully take First Amendment interests into consideration. Brown v. Elec.
Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1242 (9th Cir. 2013). The test used today is the Rogers test, which is part of the
focus of this Comment. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989); infra Part IV.A.
30 See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1111.
31 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 28:15. According to the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 9 (1995), a trademark has three main requirements: it must have distinctiveness, functionality,
and use. See also DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 8, at 45.
32 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 28:15; see, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395,
1400 (9th Cir. 1992) (explaining that Vanna White’s persona was the trademark in a case in which Samsung
had an advertisement that created consumer confusion over whether White endorsed Samsung’s VCR
product).
27
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plaintiff’s connection with the defendant’s goods or services or as to the
sponsorship or approval by [the] plaintiff of the defendant’s goods, services or
commercial activities.”33 Only a likelihood of confusion or deception is
necessary.34 Accordingly a false endorsement claim “does not require proof of
actual . . . deception.”35
B. The Right of Publicity
Another body of law that pertains to the use of one’s likeness is the right of
publicity, which “is the inherent right of every human being to control the
commercial use of his or her identity.”36 A person’s identity consists of a
person’s “name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness.”37 There is no
federally recognized right of publicity, and, as such, protection of publicity
rights comes from state law.38 The right developed out of common law privacy
rights; thus, a brief understanding of the right of privacy is necessary.39
Right of privacy is a tort law concept designed to prevent “truthful but
intrusive and embarrassing disclosures by the press.”40 Judges felt that the
main notion behind the right of privacy, or the “right to be let alone,” was
inapplicable to a celebrity plaintiff who in fact wanted to be well-known, thus
leading to the creation of the right of publicity.41 The right of publicity

33

5 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 28:15.
Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. § 28:1.
37 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001).
38 DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 8, at 836.
39 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 28:4.
40 Id. § 28:3. There are four classic rights to privacy. These categories were first suggested by Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193 (1890). William Prosser then articulated that the four categories incorporated in a personal right to
privacy are “1. Protection against intrusion into one’s private affairs; 2. Avoidance of disclosure of one’s
embarrassing private facts; 3. Protection against publicity placing one in a false light in the public eye; and
4. Remedies for appropriation, usually for commercial advantage, of one’s name or likeness.” DONALD E.
BIEDERMAN ET AL., LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRIES 186 (5th ed. 2007). The first
three categories are the classic right to be let alone, while the fourth class focuses on the “proprietary interests
of protecting against misappropriation of one’s name or likeness for commercial gain.” Id. The right of
publicity flowed out of the fourth category. See id.
41 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 28:4 (“[W]hat the celebrity wanted was not protection against
unreasonable intrusion into privacy, but a right to control the commercial value of identity . . . .”). Judge
Jerome Frank, the first to use the term “right of publicity,” noted that “many prominent persons (especially
actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their likeness, would
feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their
34

RUBIN GALLEYS PROOFS2

1398

5/7/2015 10:54 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:1389

emerged as a separate right, relating to the “commercial damage to the
business value of human identity.”42 Simply stated, a celebrity will bring a
claim for violation of his or her right of publicity based on that individual’s
economic interest in his or her own persona.43 The notion behind the claim is
that someone else used the celebrity’s persona without consent, impermissibly
enriching the person who appropriated the celebrity persona while causing
harm to the celebrity’s identity.44
There are two sources of the right of publicity: state statutes and the
common law.45 Thirty-one states recognize the right, and all states that
recognize the right deal with it in their own way.46 One notable state is New
York, where courts have held that both privacy and publicity rights are
narrowly confined under a 1903 statute.47 California is on the other end of the
spectrum and has a more, if not the most, robust right of publicity.48 Those two
states illuminate the differing treatment by courts: a plaintiff bringing a right of
publicity claim in California will have a greater chance of winning the lawsuit
than a plaintiff bringing suit in New York.49
Generally, the term “persona” encompasses the nature of a person’s
identity, which may include a person’s name, voice, performing style, or any
other identifiable and distinguishable characteristic associated with that
person.50 The right of publicity has been described as an in-gross property
right, and one’s persona can be understood to be the res, or thing, that attaches
to a set of rights.51 If individuals conceptualize the right of publicity in this
countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and subways.” Id. (quoting Haelan Labs.,
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953)).
42 Id. § 28:6.
43 Id.
44 See id.
45 DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 8, at 845 (“In the remaining jurisdictions . . . there are no recent cases
in which courts have refused to recognize the right of publicity.”). Some states, such as California, have both a
common law and statutory right of publicity. 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 28:18.
46 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 28:16.
47 Id. The statute confines a prima facie cause of action for a violation of a right of privacy to four narrow
elements, and right of publicity is not recognized as a separate right. See id. § 28:32.
48 DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 8, at 854.
49 See id. California has the most robust protection probably in part because of the entertainment industry
and the fact that many celebrities have a home located in the state. In fact, California’s tourism website
features art and film festivals as some of the things that a visitor can attend while in California. California’s
Top Performance Spaces, CAL. DREAM BIG, http://www.visitcalifornia.com/feature/californias-topperformance-spaces (last visited Apr. 27, 2015).
50 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 28:7.
51 See DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 8, at 851 (“Many of the right-of-publicity cases can be understood
as engaging in this exercise, even if the courts do not always define the exercise specifically in these terms.”).
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manner, the scope of the right can be determined if “the components of that
persona” are defined.52 Unlike Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the right of
publicity lacks an element of falsity or deception; instead, it requires
unpermitted and damaging use of the plaintiff’s identity.53
C. The Differences Between False Endorsement and The Right of Publicity
It is common for plaintiffs to plead both right of publicity infringement and
false endorsement under the Lanham Act in personal identity cases brought in
federal court.54 While the two claims have similarities, there are three
important differences between the two legal theories.
First, a substantial difference between right of publicity and false
endorsement claims is the absence of a fallacy element in the right of
publicity.55 Section 43(a) places great emphasis on falsity in false endorsement
claims, as falsity is the “sine qua non,” or the crucial element, of false
endorsement.56
Second, the right of publicity is a creature of state law, either statutory,
common law, or both, because there is no federal right of publicity.57 False
endorsement claims, on the other hand, fall under the Lanham Act, which is a
federal statute.58 This is an important distinction because a federal statute
creates greater uniformity across courts when deciding a claim, whereas states
may, and do, decide similar right of publicity claims differently depending on
the state’s law.59
Lastly, the two bodies of law protect different parties. “The right of
publicity is the inherent right of every human being to control the commercial
52

Id.
5 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 28:7 (“Under this test, it is only necessary that a more than de minimis
number of ordinary viewers (or listeners) of defendant’s use can identify the plaintiff.”).
54 DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 8, at 833–34.
55 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 28:14.
56 Id.
57 DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 8, at 845.
58 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012).
59 New York does not have an independent common law right of publicity, and any right of publicity
claim must be brought under the New York Civil Rights Laws. See Stephano v. News Grp. Publ’ns, Inc.,
474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 1984) (“Since the ‘right of publicity’ is encompassed under the Civil Rights Law
as an aspect of the right of privacy, which, as noted, is exclusively statutory in this State, the plaintiff cannot
claim an independent common-law right of publicity.”). Compare N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51
(McKinney 2009) (providing a limited right to privacy), with CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997) (providing
extensive privacy protections).
53
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use of his or her identity.”60 The focus is on the individual whose identity is
being used.61 On the other hand, the celebrity is not the center of false
endorsement claims. Rather, Section 43(a) places great weight on falsity and
likelihood of deception in order to protect the consumer from mistakenly
believing that the celebrity endorsed the product.62
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Although Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and the right of publicity protect
different parties and interests, both bodies of law are limited by the First
Amendment; specifically, the First Amendment interest in free speech. The
Ninth Circuit employs two different tests to analyze whether the interest in free
speech should act as a check on countervailing interests depending on what
claim the celebrity brings. While the court adopted the Rogers test for
Section 43(a) claims, the court embraced the transformative use test for right of
publicity claims. The two tests take free speech concerns into account
differently, and the background of the court’s implementation of each test is
explained below. Before examining the tests the Ninth Circuit uses to balance
interests, it is necessary to understand the First Amendment interest in free
speech and why courts seek to protect that interest.
A. The First Amendment: A Brief Overview of Free Speech
Whether a celebrity brings an action pursuant to state law right of publicity,
a federal claim under the Lanham Act, or both, those laws protect interests that
must be balanced with the First Amendment interest in free speech. The First
Amendment states, in relevant part, that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”63 Freedom of speech, also known as
free expression,64 protects an individual’s right to communicate messages and
ideas.65 The framers of the Constitution enshrined this notion because they
believed that speech should be protected in order to prevent silencing by the
government.66
60

5 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 28:1.
See id.
62 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A); see DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 8, at 834.
63 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
64 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2743 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[A]
law that regulates expression ‘raises special First Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect
on free speech.’” (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871–72 (1997))).
65 See id. at 2733 (majority opinion).
66 New York Times, Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 715–16 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
61
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The case law of the U.S. Supreme Court extensively protects free speech
and has expanded freedom of speech to include freedom within expressive
works.67 Expressive works are bodies of artistic work such as books, plays,
movies, and videogames.68 These expressive works have features such as
dialogue, plot, music, and characters.69 Because the interest in free speech
encompasses expressive works, governmental rights cannot silence speech
when individuals use expressive components in communications.70 However,
courts need to balance a party’s First Amendment interest in free expression
with countervailing interests when an individual’s likeness is used. This
balance is highlighted when a celebrity brings an infringement of the right of
publicity or a violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act claim. When an
expressive work uses a celebrity’s identity, that use would not be protected
were it not for the First Amendment interest in free speech.
B. The Balance Between Section 43(a) Interests and the Interest in Free
Expression: The Rogers Test
Section 43(a)’s scope is limited by the interest in free expression because of
the value of the communications found in the expressive work.71 Recognizing
the need to balance these concerns, the Second Circuit articulated a new test in
Rogers v. Grimaldi,72 appropriately termed the Rogers test.73 In Rogers, the
famous actress Ginger Rogers alleged that the producers and distributors of the
film entitled Ginger and Fred violated the Lanham Act and infringed her
common law rights of publicity and privacy.74
Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire were an internationally famous duo in the
show-business industry.75 The defendants–appellees produced and distributed
the film in the United States and Europe.76 The film depicted a story of two
fictional Italian cabaret performers who imitated the famous duo and were
known as Ginger and Fred.77 The motion picture centered around the televised
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

See Entm’t Merchs., 131 S. Ct. at 2733.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 2013).
875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
Brown, 724 F.3d at 1239.
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 996–97.
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reunion of the two imitators years after they retired.78 On appeal, the Second
Circuit examined whether the use of the title Ginger and Fred violated
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and whether the constitutional interest in free
expression should limit Section 43(a).79 The court noted that “[b]ecause
overextension of Lanham Act restrictions in the area of titles might intrude on
First Amendment values, we must construe the Act narrowly to avoid such a
conflict.”80 The court therefore determined that Section 43(a) should “apply to
artistic works only when the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion
outweighs the public interest in free expression.”81
Under the Rogers test, [Section] 43(a) will not be applied to
expressive works “unless the [use of the trademark or other
identifying material] has no artistic relevance to the underlying work
whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the [use of the
trademark or other identifying material] explicitly misleads as to the
source or the content of the work.”82

Put simply, there are two situations in which a work is not entitled to First
Amendment protection, and the balance weighs in favor of protecting
Section 43(a) interests.83 The first circumstance is a work that has no artistic
relevance.84 The second circumstance involves a work that meets the minimum
standard of artistic relevance but is explicitly misleading as to the source or the
content of the work.85 The requirement that the work be explicitly misleading
strikes at the core purpose of trademark law. Specifically, trademark law
functions to protect against consumer confusion “in the marketplace by
allowing a trademark owner to prevent others from duping consumers into
buying a product they mistakenly believe is sponsored by the trademark
owner.”86 The court in Rogers held that the film’s title had artistic relevance
and was not explicitly misleading, so the interest in free expression outweighed
78

Id. at 997.
Id. at 998 (“Though First Amendment concerns do not insulate titles of artistic works from all Lanham
Act claims, such concerns must nonetheless inform our consideration of the scope of the Act as applied to
claims involving such titles. Titles, like the artistic works they identify, are of a hybrid nature, combining
artistic expression and commercial promotion.” (footnote omitted)).
80 Id.
81 Id. at 999.
82 Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 2013) (second and third alterations in
original) (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999).
83 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
84 See id.
85 See id.
86 E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Mattel Inc. v Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 806 (9th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
79
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the Section 43(a) interests, and the court held in favor of the film producers
and distributors.87
The court then turned to Rogers’s common law right of publicity and
privacy claims. The Second Circuit recognized the difference in interests that
the two different bodies of law seek to protect and noted that the right of
publicity does not require likelihood of confusion as a necessary element.88
Right of publicity “is potentially more expansive than the Lanham Act.
Perhaps for that reason, courts delineating the right of publicity, more
frequently than in applying the Lanham Act, have recognized the need to limit
the right to accommodate First Amendment concerns.”89 However, since state
law governs right of publicity claims, the court applied the substantive law of
Rogers’s domicile, which was Oregon.90 Oregon courts at the time had not
determined the scope of the right of publicity. Consequently, the Second
Circuit was tasked with determining how the New York courts would predict
how the Oregon courts would apply the law.91 The court determined that New
York would recognize limits in Oregon law and would not expect Oregon to
allow the right of publicity to act as a bar in the use of a celebrity’s name in a
film title.92 Thus, the court found in favor of the film producers and distributors
under both the Section 43(a) claim and Rogers’s right of publicity and privacy
claims.93
The Ninth Circuit adopted the Rogers test for Section 43(a) claims in 2002
in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc.94 Mattel, a toy manufacturer, created
Barbie, a doll described as a “glamorous, long-legged blonde.”95 In Mattel, a
Danish band, Aqua, produced a song titled “Barbie Girl,” and in the song, a
band member impersonated Barbie.96 Mattel brought suit against the music
87 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001. As an example of a title that would be explicitly misleading, the court said
that the Lanham Act may apply to a title such as “The True Life Story of Ginger and Fred.” Id. at 1000.
88 Id. at 1004.
89 Id. (citing Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging
Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 160–66).
90 Id. at 1002.
91 Id. Note that the case was originally brought in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York and was then brought to the Second Circuit on appeal. This is why determining how
New York courts would apply the law comes into play here. See id. at 996.
92 Id. at 1004.
93 See id. at 1001–02, 1005.
94 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir.
2013).
95 Mattel, 296 F.3d at 898.
96 Id. at 899 (“[O]ne bandmember impersonates Barbie, singing in a high-pitched, doll-like voice;
another bandmember calling himself Ken, entices Barbie to ‘go party.’”).
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companies under various claims, including violation of the Lanham Act for
producing, marketing, and selling the song.97 The Ninth Circuit explained that
“[a] trademark ‘inform[s] people that trademarked products come from the
same source.’”98 The court noted that trademark owners have property rights
that must be balanced with the interest in free expression in order to avoid
consumer confusion in the marketplace.99 However, the court went on to
explain that a problem occurs when trademarks surpass their identifying
purpose and become ingrained in society as something more.100
The Ninth Circuit noted that the test the court traditionally used to balance
the trademark owner’s rights against free expression was not adequate when
dealing with a trademark that has become more than a source identifier.101 The
trademark, Barbie, was considered to be part of society’s everyday vocabulary,
making it hard for people to describe the product in any other way.102 Since
Mattel’s trademark had taken on a meaning beyond source identification, and
because the name Barbie was used in the title of a song, the court looked to
Rogers v. Grimaldi.103 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit’s
analysis in Rogers and adopted the two-pronged Rogers test.104 Applying the
Rogers test, the court held that Barbie was artistically relevant to the work and
that the song title did not explicitly mislead consumers into believing that
Mattel produced the song; therefore the court held in favor of the song
producers.105
The Ninth Circuit has subsequently expanded the scope of the Rogers test
from cases involving the use of a trademark, or other identifying material, in

97

Id.
Id. at 900 (second alteration in original) (quoting New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc.,
971 F.2d 302, 305 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992)).
99 Id. (“Whatever first amendment rights you may have in calling the brew you make in your bathtub
‘Pepsi’ are easily outweighed by the buyer’s interest in not being fooled into buying it.” (quoting Alex
Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 973 (1993)) (some internal quotation marks
omitted)).
100 Id.
101 Id. The court traditionally used the likelihood of confusion test, which will be explained later in this
Comment. See infra Part IV.C.
102 Mattel, 296 F.3d at 900 (“[W]hen we’d find it difficult to describe the product any other way (as in the
case of aspirin), or when the mark (like Rolls Royce) has taken on an expressive meaning apart from its
source-identifying function . . . .”).
103 Id. at 900–01.
104 Id. at 902.
105 Id.
98
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titles to uses within the body of the work.106 Importantly, the Ninth Circuit
applied the Rogers test in one of the cases central to this Comment, Brown v.
Electronic Arts, Inc.107
C. The Balance Between Right of Publicity Interests and the Interest in Free
Expression: The Transformative Use Test
Like a trademark, the right of publicity may be infringed—illegally
appropriated—when a two-prong test is met.108 First, a person’s identity must
be impermissibly used, and such use must “likely damage the commercial
value of [the person’s] inherent right” in his or her own personal identity.109
Second, the court needs to balance the interest in free speech with the person’s
economic interest in the use of his or her identity.110 Infringement only occurs
when the interest in free expression does not outweigh one’s economic interest
in one’s own identity.111 In other words, free expression rights do not protect
the commercial use of the celebrity’s identity.112
The Supreme Court has only addressed the balance between right of
publicity interests and free expression once, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co.113 In Zacchini, an employee of a television broadcasting
company filmed a performer in a “human cannonball” act against the wishes of
the performer.114 The broadcasting company played the video recording in its
entirety on the company’s news program.115 The plaintiff brought suit in Ohio,

106 See E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008). This case
involved a claim for the alleged violation of the Lanham Act brought by the owner of a strip club, “Play Pen
Gentlemen’s Club,” against the creator of the videogame, Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas, for the game’s
image of a club named “Pig Pen.” See id. at 1097–98. The court held that Rock Star’s use of E.S.S.’s
trademark was artistically relevant and not explicitly misleading. Id. at 1101.
107 724 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 2013).
108 See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 28:15.
109 Id. § 28:1; see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 565 (1977); In re NCAA
Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig. (Keller), 724 F.3d 1268, 1273 (9th Cir. 2013); Rogers,
875 F.2d at 1004.
110 See Keller, 724 F. 3d. at 1273 (“The defense is ‘a balancing test between the First Amendment and the
right of publicity based on whether the work in question adds significant creative elements so as to be
transformed into something more than a mere celebrity likeness or imitation.’” (quoting Comedy III Prods.,
Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001))); 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 28:1.
111 See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 28:1.
112 See id.
113 433 U.S. 562.
114 Id. at 563–64.
115 Id. at 564.
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and the case ascended to the Supreme Court of Ohio.116 The Supreme Court of
Ohio held that although an individual’s name or likeness cannot be used by
another for that other person’s benefit in the absence of license or privilege,
free expression interests may sometimes outweigh the right of publicity
interests.117 The court therefore held that the broadcasting company had a
privilege to report news of public interest that would otherwise be protected by
Zacchini’s right of publicity, unless the company had the intent “to appropriate
the benefit of the publicity for some non-privileged use, or . . . to injure the
individual.”118 In other words, the broadcasting company was constitutionally
free to film and show Zacchini’s performance in its entirety.119
The U.S. Supreme Court then granted certiorari to consider the issue of
whether the First Amendment protected the broadcasting company from
damages for the alleged infringement of Zacchini’s state law right of
publicity.120 The Court reversed the Ohio Supreme Court, holding that the First
Amendment does not require protection of the broadcasting company.121 The
Court noted that Ohio may privilege the broadcasting company based on its
own state law, but the First Amendment did not require Ohio to do so.122
The rationale behind the Court’s decision to protect the right of publicity
was to prevent unjust enrichment.123 The Court noted, “No social purpose is
served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would
have market value and for which he would normally pay.”124 Zacchini
illustrates what is potentially the strongest case for right of publicity because
the claim involved Zacchini’s entire performance.125 The use of Zacchini’s
performance was “not the appropriation of an entertainer’s reputation to
enhance the attractiveness of a commercial product, but the appropriation of
the very activity by which the entertainer acquired his reputation in the first
116

See id. at 565.
Id.
118 Id. (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 351 N.E.2d 454, 455 (Ohio 1976))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
119 Id.; see also id. at 570.
120 Id. at 565.
121 Id. at 578–79.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 576.
124 Id. (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
125 Id. (“[T]he broadcast of petitioner’s entire performance, unlike the unauthorized use of another’s name
for purposes of trade or the incidental use of a name or picture by the press, goes to the heart of petitioner’s
ability to earn a living as an entertainer.”).
117
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place.”126 The Court therefore used an objective analysis, asking whether the
use of the individual’s likeness was the individual’s entire act.127
Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis did not clarify what
interests should prevail in the balance in less clear-cut cases when something
less than an individual’s entire performance is used. Additionally, the case did
not solve problems that arise due to the different application of the right of
publicity across different states. Even though federal constitutional
requirements did not require favoring First Amendment interests in Zacchini,
the Court noted that Ohio may do so on state law grounds, therefore creating
uncertainty.128
To provide some guidance for balancing free speech and right of publicity
interests, the California Supreme Court created the transformative use test in
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc. as a defense.129 The court
provided five key factors to consider when applying the transformative use test
to determine if an artistic work deserves First Amendment protection.130 First,
if “the celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an original
work is synthesized, it is more likely to be transformative than if the depiction
or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of the work in
question.”131 Second, as long as the artistic work is something more than the
celebrity’s likeness, the work is protected because it is considered to be the
artist’s own expression.132 Third, “a court should conduct an inquiry ‘more
quantitative than qualitative’ and ask ‘whether the literal and imitative or the
creative elements predominate in the work.’”133 Fourth, the court should
conduct a second inquiry in close cases, asking whether “the marketability and
economic value of the challenged work derive primarily from the fame of the
celebrity depicted.”134 Finally, “‘when an artist’s skill and talent is manifestly
subordinated to the overall goal of creating a conventional portrait of a
celebrity so as to commercially exploit his or her fame,’ the work is not
transformative.”135
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

Id.
Id.
See id. at 575–76.
21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001); see also Keller, 724 F.3d 1268, 1273 (9th Cir. 2013).
Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809–10.
Id. at 809.
Keller, 724 F.3d at 1274 (quoting Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809–10).
Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 810.
Id.
Keller, 724 F.3d at 1274 (quoting Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 810).
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Comedy III involved an action brought by The Three Stooges against the
defendant for selling lithographs and t-shirts containing the group’s likeness.136
The court explained that the transformative use test is a balance “based on
whether the work in question adds significant creative elements so as to be
transformed into something more than a mere celebrity likeness or
imitation.”137 When a work has “significant transformative elements, it is not
only especially worthy of First Amendment protection, but it is also less likely
to interfere with the economic interest protected by the right of publicity.”138
The court explained that even if an artist created a work for financial gain, the
interest in free expression still applies139 because two main purposes behind
First Amendment protection are “to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas” and to preserve self-expression.140
The court held that the t-shirts with lithographs of The Three Stooges’ faces
did not meet the transformative use test; thus right of publicity interests
prevailed and outweighed free expression.141 The holding of Comedy III was
the opposite of the holding in Rogers, discussed above, in which the Second
Circuit found in favor of the defendants.142 The contrasting holdings of
Comedy III and Rogers illuminate the lack of uniformity across states when
evaluating the balance of interests in right of publicity claims. The courts in
those cases apply different tests when evaluating the right, highlighting the
differing treatment of the right of publicity in California compared to New
York.143 California courts have used the transformative use test since
Comedy III, and the Ninth Circuit continued its use in the second key case of
this Comment, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Litigation (Keller).

136

Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 800.
Id. at 799.
138 Id. at 808.
139 Id. at 802.
140 Id. at 803 (quoting Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 458 (Cal. 1979) (in banc))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
141 Id. at 811.
142 See supra Part II.B.
143 See supra note 59.
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III. TWO KEY NINTH CIRCUIT CASES HIGHLIGHTING THE CONTRAST BETWEEN
FALSE ENDORSEMENT AND RIGHT OF PUBLICITY—SIMILAR FACTS, OPPOSITE
HOLDINGS
Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc. and Keller are both cases that involve the use
of a football player’s likeness in a videogame series developed by Electronic
Arts (EA). EA has been manufacturing, distributing, and producing the
Madden NFL series of football videogames since 1989.144 Users of the game
control avatars, which represent well-known football players, and those avatars
play in simulated football games.145 Some of the avatars mirror current NFL
players, and those players’ names, jersey numbers, physical attributes, and
skills are incorporated into the avatars.146 The NFL and the NFL Players
Association have a licensing agreement with EA, allowing EA to use the
names and likenesses of current NFL athletes.147 Some of the versions of the
videogame also incorporate historical and all-time teams, but the games don’t
use the names of players who are no longer NFL athletes.148 However, these
players are easily recognizable, as their playing positions, former team
affiliations, ages, heights, weights, ability levels, and other qualities are
included.149
A. False Endorsement: Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc.
Plaintiff–Appellant James “Jim” Brown brought suit against Defendant–
Appellee Electronic Arts, Inc., alleging that EA violated Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.150 Brown is a retired NFL player and this suit stemmed from
EA’s alleged use of Brown’s likeness in EA’s Madden NFL series
videogames.151 Since Brown is a retired NFL player, his name is not included
in the game, but his other attributes are.152 The licensing agreement between
the NFL, the NFL Players Association, and EA therefore does not cover the

144

Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id.
146 Id.
147 See id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 1238–39. Brown also brought claims for invasion of privacy and unfair and unlawful business
practices under California law, but the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these
claims and so the Lanham Act claim was the focus of this case. Id. at 1240.
151 Id. at 1238–40.
152 See id. at 1240.
145
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use of Brown’s likeness because he is retired.153 The United States District
Court for the Central District of California applied the Rogers test and held in
favor of EA, finding that neither prong of the test was satisfied, and so the
interest in free speech limited Section 43(a) interests.154
The Ninth Circuit began its discussion of Brown’s Lanham Act claim by
reiterating that the Rogers test is the appropriate test for balancing the interest
in free expression with Section 43(a) interests for expressive works.155 The
Ninth Circuit adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s finding that videogames
should be given the same protection as more traditional forms of expression,
such as protected plays or books.156 “[V]ideo games communicate ideas—and
even social messages—through many familiar literary devices (such as
characters, dialogue, plot and music)[,] . . . and . . . these similarities to other
expressive mediums ‘suffice[ ] to confer First Amendment protection.’”157
In applying the first prong of the Rogers test, the court explained that “‘the
level of [artistic] relevance [of the trademark or other identifying material to
the work] merely must be above zero’ for the trademark or other identifying
material to be deemed artistically relevant.”158 The use of Brown’s likeness
was considered to be artistically relevant to the videogames, as the court
explained that “EA prides itself on the extreme realism of the games.”159
Brown’s likeness was therefore determined to be crucial to the games’
expressive purpose.160 Brown argued that the minimal standard for artistic
relevance makes the Rogers test a rigid and inflexible rule that automatically
protects First Amendment expressive freedom at the cost of consumer
confusion.161 The court nevertheless defended its position, stating that the
balance does not dictate that both sides are weighted equally and that the test
applies when free speech rights are at their peak of importance: when dealing
with expressive works.162

153

Id.
Id. at 1239.
155 Id. at 1241.
156 Id. (citing Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2731 (2011)).
157 Id. (final alteration in original) (quoting Entm’t Merchs., 131 S. Ct. at 2733).
158 Id. at 1243 (alteration in original) (quoting E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc., v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547
F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008)).
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 1244–45.
162 Id. at 1245.
154

RUBIN GALLEYS PROOFS2

2015]

5/7/2015 10:54 AM

THE KEY TO BEING A GOOD REFEREE

1411

Turning to the second prong, the court emphasized that “the creator must
explicitly mislead consumers” and that the “slight risk that . . . use of a
celebrity’s name might implicitly suggest endorsement or sponsorship to some
people is outweighed by the danger of restricting artistic expression.”163 Unless
the use is explicitly misleading to consumers, the Lanham Act’s interests are
outweighed by free expression concerns.164 The key question under this prong
was whether consumers would be confused or deceived into believing that
Brown was somehow behind the games or sponsored them because of the use
of his likeness in the games.165 The mere “use of the mark alone is not enough
to satisfy this prong.”166 Brown argued that the use of his likeness plus a
consumer survey, showing that a majority of the public thinks that identifying
marks cannot be part of products unless the mark holder gave permission,
indicated that consumers were explicitly misled.167 However, the court gave no
weight to the survey evidence, and it was not sufficient to meet the explicitly
misleading threshold.168 The key is that for Brown to have won, EA would
have had to explicitly mislead consumers regarding Brown’s involvement,
regardless of any implicit assumptions made by consumers.169
Brown also claimed that EA officials made explicitly misleading
comments.170 Officials allegedly stated, at a University of Southern California
Law School conference, that EA was able to use the images and likenesses of
NFL athletes because EA has written authorization from the NFL and the NFL
players.171 Judge Bybee, writing for the panel, pointed out that the alleged
statement was the best argument Brown offered under this prong, but the court
held that this statement was made to a limited audience and not to
consumers.172 Had the statement been presented on the back cover of the game,
this “might satisfy the ‘explicitly misleading’ prong, . . . but a statement made
at an academic conference about all of the likenesses used in the game could

163 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999–1000 (2d Cir. 1989))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 1246.
169 See id.
170 Id. at 1247.
171 Id.
172 Id.
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not realistically be expected to confuse consumers as to Brown’s
involvement.”173
The court held that the district court did not err in finding that the use of
Brown’s likeness was artistically relevant and that EA did not explicitly
mislead consumers.174 Just like the Second Circuit’s holding in Rogers,175 and
the Ninth Circuit’s previous holdings in Mattel176 and E.S.S.,177 the Ninth
Circuit here found that free expression outweighed the Lanham Act’s interest,
despite the fact that Brown “is a public figure whose persona can be deployed
for economic benefit.”178
B. Right of Publicity: Keller
The facts of Keller are extremely similar to those in Brown, yet the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the right of publicity claim trumped free expression
concerns. Samuel Keller is a former college football player, and he filed a class
action against videogame developer EA alleging violations of class members’
rights of publicity.179 Keller brought the right of publicity claim due to EA’s
use of Keller’s likeness in the NCAA Football videogame series.180 The 2005
edition of the game had an avatar playing for Arizona State’s team with the
same height, weight, skin tone, home state, play style, and jersey number
(among other characteristics) as Keller had in reality.181 Additionally, in the
2008 edition of the game, the avatar, like Keller, played for Nebraska and had
the same characteristics as it did in the 2005 edition, but this version omitted
the jersey number, arguably because Keller had changed his number before the
actual season started.182
The court applied the transformative use test to evaluate EA’s use of
Keller’s likeness and held that there was a lack of significant transformative
elements; therefore, EA was not entitled to the transformative use defense.183
The court focused primarily on the use of Keller’s likeness rather than the
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183

Id.
Id. at 1248.
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1001 (2d Cir. 1989).
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002).
E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc., v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 2008).
Brown, 724 F.3d at 1240, 1248.
Keller, 724 F.3d 1268, 1271–72 (9th Cir. 2013).
See id. at 1271.
Id. at 1272.
Id.
Id. at 1276.
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transformative elements of the entire videogame.184 The court held that the
avatar representing Keller was not an entirely new character and that, despite
anything else that may happen in the game, the avatar was doing the same
activity that brought Keller celebrity status.185 In other words, the videogame
recreated Keller “in the very setting in which he has achieved renown,”186
namely a collegiate career on a football field.187
The Ninth Circuit held that the right of publicity interests therefore
outweighed the First Amendment interest in free expression because the
expressive work was not communicating anything new.188 While EA argued
that the court should apply the Rogers test to evaluate right of publicity claims,
the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, explaining that the Rogers test was
designed to protect consumers from confusion—“the hallmark element of a
Lanham Act claim”—while “[t]he right of publicity protects the celebrity, not
the consumer.”189
Judge Thomas dissented and argued that the interest in free expression
should outweigh right of publicity interests.190 Judge Thomas acknowledged
the five analytical factors that Comedy III provided but noted that those factors
were not supposed to be condensed and argued that “excessive deconstruction
of Comedy III can lead to misapplication of the [transformative use] test.”191
The dissent advocated for examining the transformative elements in the entire
videogame and not just focusing on the particular avatar in question.192
184 Id. The dissent argued that the transformative elements of the game as a whole should be the focus and
not simply the individual avatar. Id. at 1285 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
185 Id. at 1277 (majority opinion). As part of the analysis, the court compared the use of Keller’s likeness
to the use of a celebrity’s likeness in Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Ct. App. 2006),
where a claim was brought by the singer Kierin Kirby for the alleged violation of the singer’s right of publicity
for the use of Kirby’s likeness in a videogame. The California Court of Appeals held that the videogame was
transformative and was given First Amendment protection, outweighing right of publicity interests because the
artistic work was sufficiently transformative. Kirby’s signature expression was “ooh la la,” and the avatar was
called “Ulala.” Id. at 609. In the game, the avatar was a reporter from outer space, and the court said that it was
a “fanciful, creative character” not found in the exact context that brought Kirby fame. Id. at 618 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
186 Keller, 724 F.3d at 1271.
187 Id. at 1276. The court relied heavily on No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397
(Ct. App. 2011), in which the California Court of Appeals held that Activision’s “Band Hero” videogame did
not satisfy the transformative use test because the band members of “No Doubt” were not transformed into
entirely new characters as in Kirby. See id. at 409–12.
188 Keller, 724 F.3d at 1283–84.
189 Id. at 1280–81.
190 Id. at 1284 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
191 Id. at 1285.
192 Id.
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Looking at the factors derived from Comedy III, the dissent argued that
Keller’s likeness was just one of the “raw materials” of the game.193 The
dissent further argued that the work as a whole is EA’s artistic expression and
that the “marketability and economic value of the game” resulted from those
transformative elements and not just from the use of the singular athlete’s
likeness.194 Judge Thomas concluded that the transformative elements of the
game as a whole “predominate[d] over the commercial use of the athletes’
likenesses,” and so the interest in free expression should have prevailed.195
IV. PROPOSAL: A NEW TEST FOR EVALUATING FALSE ENDORSEMENT CLAIMS
Part IV will explain why the Rogers test is an inadequate test to employ
when evaluating false endorsement claims because the test applies an artificial
standard of above-zero artistic relevancy, allows artists to implicitly mislead
consumers into believing that a celebrity endorsed a product, and fails to
sufficiently consider Section 43(a)’s interest in protecting consumers. While
the transformative use test is a better test for courts to apply when analyzing a
false endorsement claim, it is also insufficient because it, too, fails to
adequately take consumers’ interests into account.
This Comment proposes that courts adopt a new test that combines the
transformative use test and a modified likelihood of confusion test to analyze
false endorsement claims. This Part will describe the likelihood of confusion
test. Prior to adopting the Rogers test, the Ninth Circuit applied the likelihood
of confusion test in false endorsement claims. The relevant factors of the
modified likelihood of confusion test will be identified and the procedure of
how to analyze and weigh the factors will be explained. The proposed test
would adequately take consumers’ interests into consideration while still
emphasizing the importance of protecting free expression. To illuminate how
the new test would achieve these ends, this Part concludes by applying the
suggested test to Brown and explaining how the outcome would differ from the
Ninth Circuit’s holding.

193

Id. at 1286.
Id. at 1284, 1286. The dissent therefore argued that this case was more aligned with Kirby than with
No Doubt and pointed out that immutability of the avatar was a key factor in No Doubt, whereas in the NCAA
videogame, players could change the avatars. Id. at 1286–87.
195 Id. at 1284.
194
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A. Critique of the Rogers Test
The Ninth Circuit’s adoption of the Rogers test in Brown was inappropriate
to evaluate false endorsement claims because the Rogers test fails to
adequately take consumers’ interests into account. There are many issues with
the Rogers test that need to be exposed to understand why the Rogers test is
unsuitable to address the concerns of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, and this
section will employ Brown to express why.
The first prong of the Rogers test overly favors the interest in free
expression and allows an artist to use a celebrity’s likeness as long as the court
can conjure up a reason as to why the use has above-zero relevance to the art.
Under the Rogers test, the interest in free expression prevails if an expressive
work has artistic relevance.196 The use of the trademark or other identifying
material merely needs to have a scintilla of artistic relevance, such that any
slight relevance above zero will satisfy this burden.197 In Brown, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that adopting the relevancy prong provides a
“black-and-white rule” that affords a means for the court to make a decision
without engaging in “artistic analysis.”198 The court’s reasoning sacrificed
fairness for the sake of certainty. Brown made a valid argument when stating
that the first prong is rigid and inflexible.199 The unyielding minimum standard
not only creates an incredible hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome but also comes
at the expense of the deceived consumer who spends money on a product,
mistakenly believing that the celebrity endorsed it. All the artist needs to do is
provide some semblance of artistic relevance, and the use of the trademark or
identifying material is in the clear, regardless of the reasoning behind consumer
purchases.200 Both consumers and the celebrity are therefore exploited for
financial gain.
The court in Brown fails to recognize that it is still forced to engage in
more than a black-and-white artistic analysis, which it claims to be avoiding.201
Though the analysis under the relevancy prong may be less time consuming
than the transformative use test, it still requires the court to decipher a reason

196
197

See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
See Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1241–43 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Rogers, 875 F.2d at

999.

198
199
200
201

See Brown, 724 F.3d at 1243.
See id. at 1244–45.
See id. at 1241–43.
See id. at 1243.

RUBIN GALLEYS PROOFS2

1416

5/7/2015 10:54 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:1389

as to why the celebrity’s likeness was artistically relevant to the work.202 The
Ninth Circuit thus uses a standard that makes it extremely difficult for a
celebrity to succeed, and the court is willing to accept any plausible reason for
the use of the celebrity’s likeness, whether or not this was the artist’s actual
reason. The court turns a blind eye, despite the fact that a celebrity’s likeness
could be “appropriated solely because of the vastly increased marketing power
of a product bearing the name of [the celebrity]” and merely conjures up a
reason that the court feels would support the use.203 The relevancy prong
therefore overly favors the interest in free expression and does not provide the
clear-cut guidance and omission of analysis that the court believes it does.
However, it is the second prong of the Rogers test that is most troubling.
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the second, “explicitly misleading,”
prong permits consumers to mistakenly believe that a celebrity endorsed a
product so long as the artist implicitly suggests this within the art, rather than
explicitly on the packaging of the art.204 In Brown, the court noted that the
slight risk of consumer confusion due to the use of a celebrity’s likeness does
not satisfy the prong, providing no support in favor of Lanham Act interests for
anything within the videogame that could implicitly mislead consumers.205 The
Ninth Circuit noted that the explicitly misleading prong gets at the heart of
trademark law, which is to avoid consumer confusion and tricking consumers
into buying a product because they believe that the celebrity endorsed that
product.206 The court therefore stated that the crucial question under this prong
was “whether there was an ‘explicit indication,’ ‘overt claim,’ or ‘explicit
misstatement’ that caused . . . consumer confusion.”207
Brown offered up a consumer survey that indicated that a majority of the
public thought that identifying marks could not be incorporated in products
without the trademark holder’s permission.208 Yet, the court held that the use
of a trademark or identifying material plus a survey showing that the
consumers of the game thought that Brown endorsed the game was not enough

202 See id. The court engaged in this analysis when determining that the reason why Brown’s likeness was
artistically relevant was due to EA’s focus on having extremely realistic videogames.
203 Id. at 1243–44 (alteration in original) (quoting Parks v. Laface Records, 329 F.3d 437, 454 (6th Cir.
2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
204 See id. at 1245–47.
205 See id. at 1245.
206 Id.
207 Id. (quoting Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1001 (2d Cir. 1989)).
208 Id.
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to meet the explicitly misleading standard.209 The court noted that the survey
results at most indicated that some members of the public would believe that
Brown had some connection with the game, and the First Amendment interest
in free expression outweighed this risk of consumer misunderstanding.210 The
consumer confusion demonstrated in this circumstance was not sufficient for
the Ninth Circuit because the misunderstanding was not provoked by an
explicit indication on the face of the work.211 The focus of the explicitly
misleading prong therefore looks to the behavior of the user of the identifying
material––in Brown the user was EA––and not to the impact of the use of the
identifying material.212 Essentially, this standard allows artists to use a
celebrity’s likeness and reap benefits because of consumers’ belief that the
celebrity is in some way involved with the product. Since there was no
statement on the box of the videogame that Brown in some way endorsed the
game, the artist was able to get away with confusing the consumer, and the
survey data was ignored.213
According to the Ninth Circuit, the explicitly misleading prong of the
Rogers test fundamentally stands for the proposition that unless a statement
appears on the cover of the game in writing, then the interest in free expression
will outweigh Lanham Act interests.214 The Ninth Circuit admitted that an oral
statement concerning celebrity affiliation with the product is not enough and,
even worse, that “[i]f a similar statement appeared on the back cover of a
version of Madden NFL, that might satisfy the ‘explicitly misleading’
prong.”215 It logically follows that the Ninth Circuit would say that even if
there is an explicit statement on the cover of the game discussing a celebrity’s
affiliation with the game, this explicit statement is potentially insufficient to
satisfy the second prong of the test.216 The court’s use of the language “might,”
rather than a definitive, clear-cut “will,” shows just how high the burden of
209

Id. at 1245–46.
See id. at 1246.
211 Id.
212 Id. Other circuit courts of appeals have engaged in similar reasoning. For example, in ETW Corp. v.
Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003), over 60% of survey participants answered yes when asked
if they thought Tiger Woods was connected with artwork that the participants were shown, which depicted the
famous professional golfer. Id. at 937 n.19. The Sixth Circuit held that the survey evidence at most indicated
that some people would incorrectly believe that Woods was somehow connected with the work, and this risk
of misunderstanding, not provoked by any explicit indication on the face of the work, was outweighed by the
First Amendment interest in free expression. Id. at 937.
213 See Brown, 724 F.3d at 1246.
214 See id. at 1247.
215 Id. (emphasis added).
216 See id.
210
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satisfying the second prong is and how the Rogers test overly and unfairly
favors the First Amendment interest in free speech.
If the purpose of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is to protect against
consumer confusion,217 the court in Brown appears to have gotten caught up in
defining and expanding the scope of meaningless language, while losing sight
of the reason why Section 43(a) was created in the first place. A consumer
survey demonstrating that a majority of the public believed that Brown was in
some way affiliated with the videogame should hold weight if the Ninth
Circuit wants to shield consumers from endorsement confusion.218 The
Ninth Circuit’s employment of the second prong, requiring the misleading or
confusing aspect of the product to be explicit, has therefore given artists free
reign to use a celebrity’s likeness as they please, as long as the product’s
packaging does not plainly state that the celebrity endorses the product.219
Focus on the consumer has been lost, and so the Ninth Circuit should be
employing a test that properly addresses the focus of Section 43(a), taking both
implicitly misleading, as well as explicitly confusing, aspects of a product into
consideration.
B. Critique of the Transformative Use Test
Keller illuminates the superiority of the transformative use test and the
benefits that the test could provide when evaluating a false endorsement claim
because the test requires more than above-zero artistic relevance and only
protects expressive works that communicate new messages or ideas.220
However, the test has its shortcomings and does not sufficiently take
consumers’ interests into consideration.
The transformative use test, in its attempt to balance the right of publicity
against the rights preserved in the First Amendment, centers on the artist
adding significant creative elements in the expressive work in such a way that
the artist transforms the trademark or identifying material into something more
217

See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN & REESE, supra note 11, at 168.
See Brown, 724 F.3d at 1245–46.
219 See Thomas M. Byron, Spelling Confusion: Implications of the Ninth Circuit’s View of the “Explicitly
Misleading” Prong of the Rogers Test, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 10 (2011) (discussing how the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of the explicitly misleading prong protects trademark holders only for explicit, and not implicit,
misleading uses of the trademark in the artistic work).
220 See Keller, 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013); Wesley W. Wintermyer, Note, Who Framed Rogers v.
Grimaldi?: What Protects Trademark Holders Against First Amendment Immunity For Video Games?,
64 ALA. L. REV. 1243, 1261 (2013) (“[T]he transformative-use test should be the standard to which trademarks
appearing in video games are held.”).
218
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than just the celebrity’s likeness.221 The transformative requirement calls for a
level of artistic relevance that is not merely above zero, and therefore the
hurdle for the artist to overcome is greater than that in the Rogers test.222 The
transformative use test is fair in the sense that the judge must perform more of
a gatekeeping role and take a more detailed look into what the artist has added
to the elements of the expressive work, rather than simply accepting any
arbitrary reason as to why the use of the celebrity’s likeness is relevant.223
The court in Rogers noted that right of publicity recognizes the need to
accommodate First Amendment concerns more than in Lanham Act cases.224
However, case law and a comparison of Brown and Keller suggest that the
exact opposite is true.225 The court in Rogers reasoned that the scope of the
right of publicity was “potentially more expansive,” and so courts were more
likely to favor free expression concerns when making a decision.226 While the
Rogers test has overly weighted the First Amendment, the transformative use
test has found a more appropriate balance.
The Ninth Circuit explained that an artist’s expressive work will be
accorded First Amendment protection when sufficient transformative elements
have altered the use of the celebrity’s likeness to be something more than just
an imitation of the celebrity’s persona.227 By examining the five factors
provided by Comedy III, a court can more fairly determine which interests
should prevail, and therefore the interests of both the artist and the celebrity are
taken into account.228 The artist is protected because if the expressive work
created is transformative, then the interest in free expression will prevail.229
However, if the artist’s “skill and talent is manifestly subordinated to the
overall goal of creating a conventional portrait of a celebrity so as to exploit
his or her fame,” the celebrity’s interest will prevail and the celebrity will be
able to preserve his or her economic interest in his or her persona.230 The
transformative use test therefore solves many of the shortcomings of the

221

Keller, 724 F.3d at 1273.
See id.
223 See id. at 1274 (explaining the five factors set out in Comedy III).
224 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989).
225 See supra Part III.
226 See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004.
227 See Keller, 724 F.3d at 1274.
228 Id.; see also supra notes 129–35 and accompanying text.
229 Keller, 724 F.3d at 1274.
230 Id. (quoting Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
222
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Rogers test in that it provides a greater level of fairness, provides more of a
balance of interests, and actually gets at the heart of what the body of law is
trying to protect in right of publicity claims.
EA’s argument that the court should apply the Rogers test to evaluate right
of publicity claims231 highlights that there is a need for clarity and uniformity
in evaluating claims involving the unauthorized use of a celebrity’s likeness.
Unfortunately, the transformative use test alone does not solve the Ninth
Circuit’s problem in finding a suitable test to apply.
The lack of federal right of publicity protection creates issues. While the
transformative use test is better than the Rogers test, courts in different states
may assess the right differently,232 and even judges within the same court may
apply the transformative use test differently,233 indicating that clarity is lacking
for right of publicity claims. Zacchini did not provide enough guidance to
create unity across courts, and so the lack of a federal right of publicity may
lead to issues such as forum shopping.234
Thus, bringing a right of publicity claim and applying the transformative
use test isn’t sufficient on its own to provide a means of assessing the use of a
celebrity’s likeness. In addition to concerns of forum shopping235 and
disuniformity, there is another crucial shortcoming of the transformative use
test. The main reason why the transformative use test cannot be adopted as the
test in false endorsement claims, therefore making up for the lack of a federal
right of publicity, is that the test leaves out one very important party: the
consumer.236 Therefore, courts need to use a new test in order to evaluate false
231

See Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1239, 1241–43 (9th Cir. 2013).
Compare Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 799 (California court assessment of the right of publicity), with
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989) (New York court assessment of the right of publicity).
233 See, e.g., Keller, 724 F.3d at 1284 (Thomas, J., dissenting); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d
915, 938, 956–58 (6th Cir. 2003) (Clay, J., dissenting) (arguing that the artistic work that had Tiger Woods in
it was not transformative).
234 See supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing the uncertainty created by the Supreme Court’s
analysis in Zacchini). As discussed in Part I.C, differing right of publicity law among states means that various
states may, and do, decide right of publicity cases differently. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
Because of these differences, a plaintiff may bring suit in California rather than New York because of
California’s strong right of publicity.
235 Kevin L. Vick & Jean-Paul Jassy, Why a Federal Right of Publicity Statute Is Necessary, COMM.
LAW., Aug. 2011, at 14, 16. (“The patchwork of right of publicity laws encourages forum shopping by
plaintiffs. . . . Indiana is a good example. In 2005, the estate of Marilyn Monroe sued a photography archive
and a licensing company in Indiana for allegedly violating the actress’s postmortem right of publicity under
Indiana law, despite the fact that Monroe had little or no connection with Indiana during her life.”).
236 See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 28:7.
232
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endorsement claims and provide more uniformity across use-of-likeness
claims. The new test would allow for the interests of all of the parties to be
balanced, and a celebrity would therefore be able to bring a claim under
Section 43(a), potentially alleviating the downfalls of not having a federal right
of publicity.
C. The Likelihood of Confusion Test
Brown argued that the likelihood of confusion test was relevant to analyze
his false endorsement claim.237 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument,
stating that the Rogers test was the appropriate test to apply because the
likelihood of confusion test does not sufficiently account for First Amendment
interests.238
The Ninth Circuit previously employed the likelihood of confusion test
when evaluating consumer confusion in false endorsement claims.239 The court
looked at eight nonexclusive factors in determining whether a likelihood of
consumer confusion existed.240 First, the court assessed the strength of the
trademark in order to determine how much protection the mark should be
afforded.241 The court determined where on a distinctiveness hierarchy a mark
fell, and the more inherently distinctive the mark was, the more protection it
was given.242 The second factor of the test is the proximity of the goods to one
another.243 When goods are related, consumers may mistakenly believe that
there is endorsement or association of the related goods to one another.244 For
example, if there was a sock line that only produced socks with red soles, there
237

Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1242 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id.
239 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1111 (9th Cir. 1992); cf. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin
Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1403 (9th Cir. 1997); AMF Inc., v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 347–49
(9th Cir. 1979).
240 AMF, 599 F.2d at 348–49.
241 Id. at 349. The strength of a trademark is determined by assessing where on a distinctiveness hierarchy
the trademark falls. From least to most distinctive, a potential trademark may be classified as “(1) generic, (2)
descriptive, (3) suggestive, . . . (4) arbitrary or [(5)] fanciful.” Union Nat’l Bank of Tex., Laredo, Tex. v.
Union Nat’l Bank of Tex., Austin, Tex., 909 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1990).
242 AMF, 599 F.2d at 349. For example, Google was a term that did not exist and was created for the
purpose of being a trademark. Google is therefore a fanciful term that is afforded the highest protection based
on its distinctiveness. On the other end of the spectrum, generic terms are those that are so fundamental that
use of the term is given to the public and cannot be protected. See, e.g., King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin
Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1963) (explaining that “thermos” was a fanciful term that became
generic due to “extraordinary efforts” to make the public aware of the mark).
243 AMF, 599 F.2d at 350.
244 Id.
238
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may be consumers who mistakenly believe that those socks are produced by
Louboutin, based on the close relationship between socks and shoes.245 When
goods are complementary, there is a lesser requirement of similarity between
the marks.246
The second factor of the test interplays with the third, which is the
similarity of the marks.247 In determining the similarity, the court looks at and
compares the sight, sound, and meaning of the marks.248 To evaluate sight,
sound, and meaning, survey evidence and expert testimony are admissible.249
Thus, a plaintiff will point to anything that is similar between the two marks,
while a defendant will illuminate any difference.250 The fourth factor is
evidence of actual confusion, which is the strongest indication that there is a
likelihood of confusion.251 Fifth is consideration of marketing channels—i.e.,
the channels of trade.252 Under this factor, the court asks whether there is a
possibility of overlap in the markets in which the marks are sold.253 The sixth
factor is the type of goods and purchaser care.254 The analysis under this factor
asks how expensive the goods are, what quality the goods have, and how
sophisticated the purchasers are.255 When the goods are expensive and are only
purchased by an expert purchaser, then the consumer is expected to use greater
care in making his purchasing decision, and this will cut against a likelihood of
confusion.256 The seventh factor is the intent of the alleged infringer.257 This
factor considers whether the mark was adopted with the intent to deceive
consumers.258 Lastly, the eighth factor is the likelihood of expansion, and “a
‘strong possibility’ that either party may expand his business to compete with
245 See Behind the Rouge, CHRISTIAN LOUBOUTIN, (Jan. 8, 2014), http://us.christianlouboutin.com/
us_en/news/en_behind-the-rouge/ (showing that Louboutin shoes are known for having red soles).
246 AMF, 599 F.2d at 350.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 351.
249 See id. at 352. This differs from Brown, where the Ninth Circuit rejected consumer surveys as
evidence that the videogame was explicitly misleading. Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1245 (9th
Cir. 2013).
250 See AMF, 599 F.2d at 351.
251 Id. at 352.
252 Id. at 353.
253 See id.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id.; see In re N.A.D., Inc., 754 F.2d 996, 999–1000 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining that anesthesia
machines are expensive and are purchased by a more sophisticated purchaser, whereas cigarettes are
inexpensive and require less purchasing investigation and thought).
257 AMF, 599 F.2d at 354.
258 Id.
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the other will weigh in favor of finding that the present use is infringing.”259
The Ninth Circuit has noted that other factors may be part of the analysis
depending on the facts of the case and that the eight factors do not set out a
“mechanistic formula.”260 Nowhere in the analysis does the court explicitly ask
about the artist’s interest in free expression.
The Ninth Circuit has created a classic Goldilocks scenario, with the
likelihood of confusion test giving too little weight to First Amendment
concerns and the Rogers test affording too much weight to those concerns.
Now is the time to find a test that is “just right,” taking all interests adequately
into account. The combination of applying the transformative use test, acting
as a first step, with a modified likelihood of confusion test is the happy
medium for which courts should strive for when evaluating false endorsement
claims.
D. The New Test
When evaluating a Section 43(a) claim, courts should first apply the
transformative use test. The court should apply the test to analyze the specific
celebrity’s likeness or persona in question, rather than the artistic work as a
whole.261 If the artist did not add significant creative elements to the celebrity’s
likeness in the expressive work, then the interest in free expression should take
a backseat.262 In that scenario, the celebrity’s identity has not been transformed
and is merely a depiction of the celebrity’s likeness.263 The celebrity’s and
consumers’ interests should be protected because the artist has not conveyed
something new, and the artistic expression is therefore not worthy of First
Amendment protection.
If the court finds that the artist did add significant creative elements,
therefore transforming the celebrity’s identity, then the First Amendment
interest in free expression is at its peak.264 The celebrity’s interest in his or her
likeness is at a low because the artistic work is no longer just a mere portrayal
259

Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 731(b) & cmt. c (1938)).
Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books, USA, Inc. 109 F.3d 1394, 1404 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21 cmt. a (1995)).
261 The Ninth Circuit adopted this approach in Keller, contrary to Judge Thomas’s dissenting opinion that
the transformative use test should be applied to the entire artistic work. See Keller, 724 F.3d 1268, 1285 (9th
Cir. 2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
262 See id. at 1273 (majority opinion).
263 See id.
264 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001).
260

RUBIN GALLEYS PROOFS2

1424

5/7/2015 10:54 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:1389

of the celebrity.265 Thus, the interest in protecting against consumer confusion
is the last hurdle in the way of guarding freedom of speech. Since free
expression is paramount at this stage,266 the court should apply a modified
version of the likelihood of confusion test to adequately, but not overly,
consider the purpose of Section 43(a), which is to protect consumers from
confusion.
The Ninth Circuit stated that the eight factors previously used in the
likelihood of confusion test were nonexclusive and could be shaped to the
specific facts of the case.267 Since trademark protection has been expanded to
include celebrities’ identities, courts should look at specific significant factors
when applying the test.268 The first factor courts should consider is the
distinctiveness of the celebrity’s identity to assess if the celebrity’s image is
strong enough to warrant protection. This factor is an alteration of the court’s
assessment of the strength of the mark. To do this, the court can look at the
degree of the celebrity’s fame. The more famous a celebrity is, the more likely
it is that corporations would target the celebrity’s likeness, causing consumers
to mistakenly believe that the celebrity endorsed the product.269 In order to
assess celebrity identity distinctiveness, expert opinions could be based in part
on social media outlets such as Twitter and Facebook.270 Expert opinions and
survey evidence could also look at the number of sponsors and endorsements
the celebrity has. A celebrity’s level of distinctiveness would be determined by
comparing the specific celebrity in question to other celebrities who are
famous in the same particular field. The more sponsors and endorsement deals
the celebrity has, and the larger the celebrity’s fan base, the more popular the

265

Id. at 799.
Id. at 808.
267 Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1404 (9th Cir. 1997).
268 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 28:15; see also supra note 32 and accompanying text.
269 See supra notes 1–2, 24–30 and accompanying text.
270 Compare Jim Brown, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/jimbrownofficial (last visited Apr. 27,
2015) (showing that Jim Brown has more than 100,000 likes on Facebook), with Kim Kardashian, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/kimkardashian (last visited Apr. 27, 2015) (showing that Kim Kardashian has more
than 24,000,000 likes on Facebook). While expert opinions can be costly, the cost won’t be as detrimental to
celebrities who seek to protect their likeness, compared to the cost for an average person. Compare New York
Yankees Salary/Payroll Information - 2015, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/mlb/team/salaries/_/name/nyy/newyork-yankees (last visited Apr. 27, 2015) (showing that New York Yankee CC Sabathia’s 2015 salary is
$24,285,714), with NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, RANKINGS & ESTIMATES: RANKINGS OF THE STATES 2012 AND
ESTIMATES OF SCHOOL STATISTICS 2013, at 76 (2012), available at http://www.nea.org/assets/img/
content/NEA_Rankings_And_Estimates-2013_%282%29.pdf (stating that the average U.S. classroom
teacher’s 2012–2013 salary is estimated to be $56,383).
266
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celebrity is and the more society is aware of the celebrity.271 If a celebrity is
known worldwide by persons of multiple segments of society, then that
person’s influence is pervasive and the mark is more distinctive.
For instance, Jay-Z tours worldwide and is known as a famous rapper in the
music world by people of all ages.272 Even a sports fan would recognize the
name Jay-Z as a previous owner of the NBA team, the Brooklyn Nets.273
Unlike Jay-Z, Kelly Johnson is not as well-known. Johnson is currently a
baseball player for the Atlanta Braves; however, far fewer people would
recognize his name, and it is likely that only baseball fans would know who he
is.274 Jay-Z’s fame would be highly distinctive on the scale, while Kelly
Johnson would be less distinctive on the fame hierarchy and his celebrity
identity therefore weaker.
The degree of the celebrity’s distinctiveness should be the first step in the
analysis. The weaker the celebrity’s identity, the less likely it is that consumers
are going to be confused about celebrity endorsement. Though consumers may
recognize the celebrity’s likeness incorporated in the product, the celebrity
with a weaker identity will not be the reason behind consumer purchases;
therefore, free expression should be protected. The celebrity’s level of
distinctiveness should dictate whether free expression wins out or if the court
should continue in its analysis.
The second key factor of the modified likelihood of confusion test is
evidence of actual confusion, as this is the best indication that consumers
incorrectly believe that the celebrity endorsed the product.275 A strong celebrity
identity coupled with actual consumer confusion of celebrity endorsement,
demonstrated by survey evidence and expert testimony, should result in

271

See Andrew Barker, Branding Deals With Pop Stars Go Beyond the Casual Endorsement, VARIETY
(Apr. 16, 2013, 8:15 AM PT), http://variety.com/2013/music/features/endorsement-deals-1200334594/
(“When a flexible company and a brand-conscious artist see eye-to-eye, the results can be spectacular. One
need look no further than 50 Cent’s deal with Vitamin Water . . . .”).
272 See Mikael Wood, It’s Good to be King: Jay Z Exercises His Power in a Swaggering Show at Staples,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2013, at D1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/10/entertainment/la-et-msreview-jay-z-magna-carter-world-tour-staples-center-20131210 (“Jay Z, the king of hip-hop . . . brought his
Magna Carter World Tour to a full house of loyal subjects.”).
273 See Mike Ozanian, Jay Z Sells Piece of Nets for Second-Highest Price in NBA History, FORBES (Sept.
6, 2013, 11:05 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2013/09/06/jay-z-sells-piece-of-nets-forsecond-highest-price-in-nba-history/.
274 See Kelly Johnson, FOX SPORTS, http://www.foxsports.com/mlb/kelly-johnson-player (last visited Apr.
27, 2015).
275 See AMF Inc., v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 352 (9th Cir. 1979).
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consumers’ interests outweighing the interest in free expression. In this
scenario, the celebrity’s influence is at an all-time high, and consumer
confusion will dictate that the court hold in favor of the plaintiff.
The final factor courts should look at is the artist’s intent when using the
celebrity’s likeness. Without a finding of actual confusion, the court should
look at whether the artist intended to deceive consumers to derive financial
gain. A finding of intent coupled with a strong celebrity identity is the second
scenario in which the court should find in favor of Section 43(a) interests
because the artist specifically chose to confuse consumers into believing that
the celebrity endorsed the product.276 If there is no actual confusion or intent
coupled with a strong celebrity identity, then the balance should weigh in favor
of free expression.
The modified test consists of a more concise means for assessing whether
there is a likelihood of consumer confusion about celebrity endorsement of the
artist’s product. If there is not a likelihood of consumer confusion, then there is
no infringement, and the court can stop in its analysis, allowing the interest in
free expression to prevail. Therefore, in order for Section 43(a) interests to
triumph, there are still high hurdles for the plaintiff to overcome, but inquiry
into these three key factors at least provides the court an opportunity to take
survey evidence and arguments such as Brown’s into account.277
Some may argue that this is a lot of analysis for the court to engage in,
which is why the court rejected the likelihood of confusion test in favor of the
Rogers test.278 However, the Ninth Circuit recognized that “when expressive
works are involved,” “First Amendment rights are at their height.”279 Therefore
it is appropriate for the court to take more than a quick look at whether the
artistic relevance of the celebrity’s likeness is above zero.280 The Ninth Circuit
was correct in stating that “a balance need not be designed to find each of the
sides weightier with equal frequency.”281 The interest in free expression should
be given more weight, but it should not completely obliterate the opportunity
for countervailing interests to shine through. The combination of the
transformative use test and the modified likelihood of confusion test provides
276

See id. at 354 (“[R]eviewing courts presume that the defendant can accomplish his purpose . . . .”).
See generally Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1245–46 (9th Cir. 2013) (rejecting survey
evidence in applying the Rogers test).
278 See id. at 1241–42.
279 Id. at 1245.
280 Cf. id. at 1244.
281 Id. at 1245.
277
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multiple opportunities for the First Amendment interest to come out on top
without smothering all other interests. Judge Kozinski made a valid point when
stating, “Intellectual property rights aren’t free: They’re imposed at the
expense of future creators and of the public at large.”282 The proposed
dual-part test alleviates some of Judge Kozinski’s concerns by providing a
more flexible and fair analysis, taking all parties’ interests into consideration
while still favoring free expression.
Critics may be concerned that the proposed test requires judges to
determine what constitutes artistic work. However, when a court initially
applies the transformative use test, the judge is not required to make aesthetic
decisions. Rather, the court merely needs to determine whether or not the artist
communicated something new by looking at the differences between the
artistic expression and the specific likeness or persona in question.283 The court
would provide free expression protection to work that provides a new message
or idea to society, therefore preventing governmental interests from silencing
speech.284 While the transformative use test may require more than a
cut-and-dry question of relevance, the court’s analysis is not much more
complicated than when applying the Rogers test. As long as the artist points to
transformative attributes of the work, the artistic expression will be
protected.285
E. Application of the Proposed Test to Brown
If the Ninth Circuit applied the proposed, novel test in Brown, the holdings
of Brown and Keller would match up. The court would first apply the
transformative use test and evaluate whether EA added enough significant
creative elements to Brown’s avatar in the videogame. In Keller, the Ninth
Circuit looked specifically at Keller’s avatar to determine whether EA had
transformed the avatar into something more than the mere image of Keller.286
The court held that the avatar was not transformed into something more than
Keller’s likeness such that the artistic work merited free expression
protection.287 The Ninth Circuit would find that EA’s avatar of Brown fails the
282

White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
See Keller, 724 F.3d 1268, 1273 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the transformative use test requires
the artist to transform the expression into something more than an imitation of the celebrity’s likeness).
284 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).
285 See Keller, 724 F.3d at 1273 (explaining that the transformative use test is a defense in a right of
publicity claim).
286 Id. at 1276.
287 See id.
283
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transformative use test because the facts of Keller and Brown are so similar.288
Brown’s avatar is a mere depiction of Brown playing football, which is what
he is famous for doing.289 Since Brown’s avatar would fail the transformative
use test, the court would stop in its analysis and would hold that Brown’s and
consumers’ interests outweigh the interest in free expression.
EA could have added significant creative elements to the avatar like Sega
did to the avatar of Keirin Kirby in Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc.290 Rather
than using Brown’s exact playing position, age, height, weight, ability levels,
and team affiliation, EA could have tweaked the avatar to play different
positions at different ability levels.291 The avatar’s ability level could fluctuate
depending on how much the videogame user had the avatar practice. EA could
have provided the option of changing Brown’s physical features such as
lengthening his hair, adding tattoos, or making him more or less muscular.
Additionally, there could be special features added, such as giving the avatar
super speed if the avatar performed specific moves like scoring a particular
number of touchdowns. Although EA changed the avatar’s jersey number from
thirty-two to thirty-seven in particular versions of the game,292 the Ninth
Circuit would find that this minor change is not a significant creative element
meriting free expression protection. The suggested alterations would weigh
towards the court finding that the avatar was transformed because the avatar
would no longer be a replica of Brown. It was EA’s emphasis on realism that
should have lead the Ninth Circuit to conclude that the avatar was a literal
depiction of Brown not warranting free expression protection.293
EA needed to make a choice between extreme realism and providing a
spectrum of avatars from current players to retirees. Choosing realism would
not cause a great disturbance to EA’s vision because EA has licensing
agreements with the NFL and the NFL Players Association, which allow EA to
288

See Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id.; see Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276.
290 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 613 (Ct. App. 2006). Kirby brought claims alleging that a videogame avatar
violated her right of publicity and the Lanham Act. Id. at 611. The California Court of Appeals explained that
while the avatar and Kirby had many similarities, including both having similarly shaped eyes and faces,
having red or pink hair, and using phrases such as “meow,” the avatar also differed from Kirby in significant
ways. Id. at 613. The avatar wore her hair in different styles than Kirby and was seen most often wearing a
specific outfit in the game that was different from what Kirby often wore. Id. The court held that the avatar
was not a literal depiction of Kirby and the interest in free expression prevailed. Id. at 618; see also supra
note 185.
291 See Brown, 724 F.3d at 1240.
292 Id. at 1246.
293 See id. at 1243.
289
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create avatars representing current NFL players.294 If EA felt that realism was
of the utmost importance, then the videogame series should have only
incorporated NFL players covered by the licensing agreements. However, if
EA felt that it was important to provide a spectrum of players, EA should have
added significant creative elements to the avatars not covered by the
agreements. If EA had transformed Brown’s avatar into something more than a
reproduction of Brown by making some of the suggested alterations, then the
interest in free expression would be paramount and the Ninth Circuit would
need to take the next step in its analysis.
Had EA transformed Brown’s avatar, the court would next apply the
modified likelihood of confusion test, first looking at the distinctiveness of
Brown’s celebrity identity. Brown is a member of the NFL Hall of Fame and
earned league most valuable player (MVP) honors four times in his career.295
He has been coined a “one-of-a-kind running back” and a Jim Brown
autographed football currently sells for around $470.296 Brown also has an
acting career, playing roles such as a coach in Any Given Sunday297 and
starring in the 2002 Spike Lee documentary Jim Brown: All-American.298 He is
a social activist for African American causes and has more than 100,000 likes
on Facebook.299 To figure out the strength of Brown’s celebrity identity, the
court could compare Brown to other famous football players. Peyton Manning
is considered one of the greatest quarterbacks of all time and has been named
the NFL’s MVP five times.300 Fox Sports and Sports Illustrated have named
Manning the NFL player of the decade for the 2000s.301 Manning has appeared
in television commercials for DirecTV and was a guest host on Saturday Night

294

Id. at 1240.
Jim Brown, PRO FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME, http://www.profootballhof.com/hof/member.aspx?
PLAYER_ID=33 (last visited Apr. 27, 2015).
296 Jim Brown Autographed Football, PRO FOOTBALL HALL OF FAME STORE, http://store.
profootballhof.com/Jim-Brown-Autographed-Football.aspx?DepartmentId=94&F_PlayerId=864 (last visited
Apr. 27, 2015).
297 Any Given Sunday–Full Cast & Crew, IMDB MOVIES, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0146838/
fullcredits?ref_=tt_ov_st_sm (last visited Apr. 27, 2015) (showing that Jim Brown played Montezuma Monroe
in the film Any Given Sunday).
298 Jim Brown: All American, IMDB MOVIES, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0309735/ (last visited Apr. 27,
2015).
299 Jim Brown, supra note 270.
300 About Peyton Manning, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/pages/Peyton-Manning/1095637257
29117?rf=109929785696723# (last visited Apr. 27, 2015) (explaining Peyton Manning’s biography).
301 Id.
295
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Live.302 An autographed Manning football sells for as much as $750,303 and he
currently has approximately 2 million likes on Facebook.304 Brown’s
background information regarding his fame is fairly similar to Peyton
Manning’s, and Brown is also known outside of the sports arena for his acting
and social activism.305 Therefore, Brown’s identity is arguably high on the
distinctiveness scale, such that when consumers hear the name “Jim Brown,”
the name evokes images of Brown specifically in consumers’ minds, rather
than an image of another individual named Jim Brown.
Since Brown has a strong celebrity identity, the court should then evaluate
whether there was actual consumer confusion that Brown endorsed the
videogame. Brown submitted a survey to the court, which showed that a
majority of the public believes that identifying marks cannot be part of
products unless the mark holder granted permission to the product creator.306
While this survey evidence aids Brown’s argument supporting actual
confusion, more information would need to be elicited, such as if consumers
actually believed that Brown endorsed the specific EA videogame series in
question. Moreover, Brown’s facts do not indicate that EA intentionally tried to
deceive consumers into mistakenly believing that Brown endorsed the
videogame.307 Without showing actual confusion or intent, the strength of
Brown’s identity is not enough for the Ninth Circuit to find a likelihood of
confusion. Thus, if EA added significant creative elements to Brown’s avatar,
the court would find in favor of free expression.
Applying the proposed test to Brown demonstrates that the new test still
elevates the interest in free expression above the countervailing interests. The
Ninth Circuit should continue to place a thumb on the scale in favor of
protecting free expression; however, the new test allows for a more thorough
consideration of the celebrity’s and consumers’ interests. A celebrity, like
302 Id. (“The [SNL] episode earned the show’s highest household rating in more than 10 months in the
metered markets.”); see Ralph Vacchiano, Ebenezer Samuel & Chris Dell, Video: Eli and Peyton Manning
Rap Their Way Through a New Commercial for DirecTV’s Sunday Ticket, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 6, 2013,
3:04
PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/video-eli-peyton-show-rapping-skills-article1.1419150; SNL Digital Short: United Way, NBC, http://www.nbc.com/saturday-night-live/video/unitedway/n12129/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2015).
303 Peyton Manning Autographed Footballs, SPORTS MEMORABILIA, http://www.sportsmemorabilia.com/
player/Peyton_Manning/autographed-footballs/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2015).
304 About Peyton Manning, supra note 300.
305 See Jim Brown Biography, BIO., http://www.biography.com/people/jim-brown-9228484 (last visited
Apr. 27, 2015).
306 Brown v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013).
307 Id. at 1246.
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Brown, can therefore bring a false endorsement claim without having the
interest in free speech oppress the interest in protecting against consumer
confusion. Further, a celebrity can feel more comfortable bringing a false
endorsement claim rather than strategically bringing a right of publicity claim
in a more favorable jurisdiction. Lastly, the new test still favors the artist, and
the artist merely needs to transform the artistic work to communicate
something new, which can be as simple as changing particular features of a
celebrity so that the expression is not just an imitation of the celebrity.
CONCLUSION
The more famous a person is the more potential influence that celebrity’s
likeness has over consumers in society. T.F. Hodge said it best when stating,
“Thirsty Celebrity: Many moons in the making, few seconds for the taking.”308
The right of publicity does not provide a sufficient forum for use-of-likeness
claims due to the absence of a federal right. Although the Lanham Act
provides a federal means for a plaintiff to bring a use-of-likeness claim, the
Ninth Circuit currently applies a test that overly favors the interest in free
expression, squelching the interest in protecting against consumer confusion
and not considering the celebrity’s interest in his or her own identity. The
Ninth Circuit and other courts should instead use the proposed novel test to
evaluate false endorsement claims falling under the Lanham Act. The new test
acts as a check on unjust enrichment and promotes creativity, while continuing
to hold a candle to the interest in free expression. The court is the referee and,
just like in a football game, the foul needs to be called and opportunity given to
the fouled party to remedy the situation. This is not to say that the game should
end in favor of the fouled party, but the favored interest should not nullify
other
considerations.
The
proposed
test
takes
all
parties’

308 ‘GOoD’ Quotes from Within by T.F. Hodge, LIVING THE ‘GOOD’ LIFE!, http://webcache.
googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://fromwithinirise.webs.com/quotesbytfhodge.htm (last visited
Apr. 27, 2015 using Google’s cache webpages).

RUBIN GALLEYS PROOFS2

1432

5/7/2015 10:54 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:1389

interests into account and assuages the need for a federal right of publicity. The
whistle needs to be blown, and the Ninth Circuit and other courts should make
the call using the new proposed test.
KIMBERLY RUBIN∗

∗ Managing Editor, Emory Law Journal; Juris Doctor Candidate, Emory University School of Law
(2015); Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, Bucknell University (2012). I would like to thank
Professor Timothy R. Holbrook for his mentorship and guidance in writing this Comment. My deepest
gratitude to the Emory Law Journal Executive Board, and a special thank you to my friends Ben Klebanoff
and Matt Hayes for their hard work and great dedication to Emory Law Journal. Finally, tremendous thanks to
my grandmother Betty, parents Mitch and Peggy, and brother Bruce for their unconditional love and support
over the years.

